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EXCISE TAXES IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
PROPERTY TAXES*
ARTunm S. DAYToN*
Disregarding the comparatively unimportant poll tax imposed
upon individuals as such, it is safe to say that, in the broadest sense,
taxation presents but two fundamental classifications - property
taxes, based upon the privilege of possessing property, and excise
taxes, based upon the privilege of performing some act or engaging
in some activity. Many taxes partake of the characteristics of both
classifications - as, for example, net income taxes, stamp taxes, and
many others, but in spite of appalling complexity and variation,
all taxation inherently must partake of the characteristics of a
property tax or an excise tax, or a mixture of both, because all
human economy in final analysis is based upon accumulated wealth
which we call property, and upon the activities of individuals.
Not only is this classification inherent in all taxes, but economic
history presents a succession of conflicts between the two under-
lying philosophies. *Whether the citizen's accumulation or his
activities should bear the primary burden of government, is a
question that has been repeatedly asked by every civilized sov-
ereignty. Early in the second century B. C., Rome had abolished
all direct taxes, including the land tax in Italy, the state being sup-
ported by income from the public domains and levies upon the
provinces. During the reign of Augustus, these sources becoming
inadequate, the Emperor desired a land tax, but opposition of the
landowners being effective, there was imposed instead a one percent
excise tax on auction sales, a four percent tax on the sale of slaves,
a five percent tax on the freeing of slaves, and a five percent inherit-
ance tax on indirect legacies above the value of about five thousand
dollars in present-day currency.
The later Roman Empire presented a steady development in
excise or occupational taxes, although the land tax, after the time
of Augustus, was also reinstated, until in the reign of Diocletian, in
addition to property taxes, there were occupational taxes in num-
ber comparable to those of our own day.
After the break-up of the Roman Empire the concept of a cen-
tralized government, with power to levy taxes, was, for a time,
preserved, but with the death of Charlemagne in the early part of
* Address delivered before the Legal Institute of the West Virginia Bar
Association at Charleston, West Virginia, September 15, 1939.
** Member of the Kanawha County bar.
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the ninth century, feudal Europe may be said fully to have com-
menced. With feudalism, taxation, as we understand it, almost
entirely ceased to exist. In many instances small principalities
emerged by reason of the superior strength, ability or opportunity
of some particular chieftain or baron. Such was particularly true
of England prior to the Norman Conquest in 1066. With the Con-
quest a great impetus was given to the royal power. William of
Normandy never exerted, or attempted to exert, the power to levy
taxes in either the Roman or modern sense. His was peculiarly
a feudal government. Theoretically the owner of all of the land,
his barons owed to him and his successors, at least in theory, a land
rental, payable originally in services in case of war or emergency.
Governmental expenses were not differentiated from the personal
expenses of the ruler, and both were largely met by income from the
personal estate of the king. The obligations of feudal service nat-
urally developed into money payments, based on possession of
property, really within the classification of property taxation. The
cycle of tax development from property to occupational taxes had
again commenced. It is almost axiomatic that in simpler forms of
civilization the burden of taxation is upon property. As govern-
ment becomes more far-reaching in its activities and civilization
becomes more complex, it follows virtually as a matter of course
that various excise taxes based on privilege or occupation arise.
So it was in England. Up to the time of the Tudors, property taxa-
tion in the guise of feudal obligation to the ruler was the chief
support of government, outside of the sovereign's personal income.
During the time of the Tudors and, more noticeably, during the
reign of the first two Stuarts, there was a very definite tendency
toward what amounted to occupational taxation. The most com-
mon form which such taxes assumed was the granting of a monopoly
to an individual or, after the statute of 1624, to a company to en-
gage in occupations, or to sell certain goods. Sometimes such
monopoly was granted merely as a matter of royal favor. More
frequently, however, it was a source of income to the sovereign.
Taxation of this character by Charles I in a large measure led to
the outbreak of the English Civil War in the middle of the seven-
teenth century. Such taxation, particularly among the commer-
cial and agricultural classes from which America was chiefly set-
tled, was intensely unpopular, and at this period the early settle-
ment of the Atlantic seaboard was most active. The settlers brought
with them an inherent opposition to the privilege or occupational
2
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imposition as they understood it. To them, it had been an instru-
ment of royal tyranny, and during colonial times such conception
was never relinquished. With this background, it is easy to under-
stand the resentment with which the stamp taxes of George III were
met. A stamp tax upon commodities or documents is predominantly
a privilege tax, although it has close relationship to property. This
historic background, with its roots deep in resentment against the
English scheme of colonial excise taxation, coupled with the com-
parative simplicity of American civilization, made the property
tax almost the sole source of revenue of the various states, imme-
diately following the adoption of the Constitution. Peculiarly
enough, however, provisions of the Constitution of the United
States as finally adopted virtually forced the Federal Government
to rely upon excise, and not property, taxes for its support. At the
time of the Constitutional Convention there were uppermost in the
public mind two classes of taxes, (a) property taxes, and (b)
duties upon imports or exports. Recognizing the danger of dis-
unity which had been so forcibly emphasized by conditions arising
under the Articles of Confederation, Article 1, Section 10 of the
Constitution provided that no state, without the consent of Con-
gress, should lay any impost or duty on imports or exports except
that which might be absolutely necessary for executing its in-
spection laws, the net proceeds of such duties and imposts to be
paid into the treasury of the United States and such levies to be
subject to the revision and control of Congress. Section 8 of the
same Article gave to Congress the power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, all but the first to be nationally uni-
form. Section 9 of the same Article withheld from Congress the
power to levy any direct taxes unless in proportion, among the
various states, to the census of population. Because of the practi-
cal difficulties attendant upon a direct tax levy under the limita-
tion of Section 9, the states alone exercised the power to levy direct
property taxes, and the Federal Government was forced to rely
upon excise or indirect taxes.
'It was the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller as expressed in the
second decision of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.," that such
division in policy between federal and state taxation was inten-
tional and the result expected by the members of the Constitutional
Convention. He states:
1158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108 (1895).
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"The founders anticipated that the expenditures of the
States, their counties, cities, and towns would chiefly be met
by direct taxation on accumulated property, while they ex-
pected that those of the Federal government would be for the
most part met by indirect taxes." 2
However, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, and
for many years thereafter, the concept of excise or indirect taxes
was much more limited than at present, not so much as a matter of
legal inhibition as in popular thinking. It is interesting, in view
of the modern extension of these taxes, to consider how closely taxes
of this type were associated with ideas of property. Cooley, writ-
ing in 1876, defines duty as an indirect tax imposed on importation,
exportation or consumption of goods; custom as a duty on imports
or exports, and an excise as an inland impost 1evied upon articles
of manufacture or sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain
trades or deal in certain commodities. These definitions were ap-
proved in the Ppllock case. It is to be noted how secondary is the
idea of a tax upon an activity disassociated from property. Per-
sonal activity taxes, so disassociated from property, were, almost
without exception, pure license taxes which had been recognized for
many centuries in English law, and from the beginning of the col-
onies in America. A pure license tax is payment for some special
privilege or immunity, and underlying it, is always the thought of
regulation, the revenue derived being of secondary importance.
Inevitably, however, particularly in periods of stress, the tempta-
tion is always present to raise public revenue in the guise of licensed
regulation. The most famous and historically significant example
of this tendency is found reflected in the Bates case,4 decided in the
early years of the reign of James I. By that time it was established
in England that an impost could not be laid otherwise than by act
of Pailiament. The sovereign levied a duty upon imported cur-
rants under his royal prerogative to regulate foreign commerce.
A subservient court upheld the imposition not as an ordinary cus-
tom or impost, but as an exercise of the royal regulatory power over
commerce. This holding was at first approved by Lord Coke, but
later severely criticized by him. Its doctrine extended by Charles
I, was one of the chief causes of the English Civil War. A typical
example of the license tax used both for the purposes of regulation
and likewise for the purpose of revenue is the tax upon intoxicating
2 Id. at 621.
3 COOLLY ON TAxATioN (1876) 6.
4 An information against Bates, Lane Ex. 22, 145 Eng. Rep. R. 267 (1606).
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liquors. By its very inherent purpose and nature, a license tax
could not be imposed upon all citizens. It only applied to those
wvho desired to exercise the special privileges which it permitted.
With the inevitable blending of the license tax and the excise tax,
there arose the problem of selective classification for the purposes
of taxation. So long as the state, through its regulatory power,
imposed a license tax on a business such as manufacture or sale of
intoxicating liquors, the engaging in monopolies and the like, all
clearly the subject of special regulation, no such problem could
arise. However, when levies were laid, frequently in the form of
pure license taxes, upon occupations not involving the exercise of
any special privilege and not involving public welfare or morals,
the problem of classification became acute. Could a state or the
Federal Government exercise its power of license taxation upon
occupations of an ordinary character not subject to regulation by
the police power ? The question came before the supreme dourt of
West Virginia in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Helton, Sheriff,
decided in 1911.' The court upheld the legislative power, saying:
" ... The Legislature has prescribed a license tax for the
carrying on of many lines of business that do not .directly
relate to the public health, safety or morals. Such, for ex-
ample, are the license taxes on vendors of patent rights, on
junk dealers, on traveling vendors of sewing, machines and
musical instruments, and on the owners of trading houseboats.
It is entirely legitimate to tax a privilege, business or occupa-
tion. Of course there must be reasonable classification, and no
unjust discrimination. The tax must be equal and uniform in
relation to all persons of the same class. But where a tax is
imposed in compliance with these principles, no excuse for it
need be sought under the police power"2
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Melton is in harmony with many
decisions in other jurisdictions, and prior to the World War its
doctrine of legislative power to tax occupations and activities not
subject to regulation under the police power and within reasonable
limits to classify and select such occupations as should be subject
to such tax, was firmly established. The next development was with
respect of the classification, through exemptions, of the particular
businesses to be taxed. Assuming, for instance, that a pipe line
involved a business subject to an occupational tax, could there be a
sub-classification among pipe companies and those with a shorter
69 W. Va. 124, 71 S. E. 19 (1911).
Id. at 125.
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line exempted from the tax? The court answered the question in
the affirmative in the opinion of Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan,'
a case reversed on general grounds by the Supreme Court of the
United States,8 but without affecting the rule above noted. Later
a monetary exemption under the West Virginia business-profession
tax was upheld in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, Tax Commis-
stoner,9 and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' Throughout all of the decided cases during the last
thirty years there has been an ever increasing liberality in up-
holding taxes of this character. Broad as this current of authority
has been, the courts have frequently asserted that no occupational
tax of a selective character was valid if it involved arbitrary or
unreasonable classification or exemption."' Exemptions based upon
the personal history or status of the taxpayer, as, for example,
prior military service, have been rejected.' 2
To summarize: Prior to the great expansion of governmental
activities, both state and federal, contemporaneous with, and fol-
lowing, the World War, there had been a steady development in
the scope of the excise tax. So far from being limited to the duties,
imposts and excises mentioned in the Federal Constitution, and as
understood at the time of its adoption, the concept of excise tax,
blended with much of the ideology of the license tax, had been so
expanded that any tax upon any occupation or activity was con-
sidered within the power of the legislature, which had likewise an
attendant power to classify and select occupations to be taxed, pro-
vided such classifications were not arbitrary and that taxes were
applicable alike to all individuals in the particular class affected.
Until the World War there had been little change in the tacit divi-
sion of taxes whereby the Federal Government supported itself
through customs receipts and internal excise taxes of a semi-regula-
tory character, - by far the most important being the tax on in-
toxicating liquors - and the states chiefly supported themselves
7 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S. E. 506 (1921).
s Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265, 42 S. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed.
227 (1921).
9 102 W. Va. 272, 13d S. E. 582 (1926).
10 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, Tax Commissioner, 274 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct.
639, 71 L. Ed. 1049 (1927).
11 See State Board of Tax Com'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540,
75 L. Ed. 1248 (1930); Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed.
929 (1932).
12 Ifarallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394 (1932) ; Laurens v. Ander-
son, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136 (1906); State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 AtI.
1081 (1903).
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from property taxes. Under the demands for revenue arising from
the Civil War and, to a much lesser degree, from the Spanish War,
the Federal Government had extended its taxing powers to embrace
an income tax on the former occasion, various documentary stamp
taxes and the like, but such were recognized as emergency measures
and, in virtually all instances, lapsed, or were repealed, after the
respective conflicts had terminated. These temporary taxes had
little effect except to furnish historical tax precedents when the
stress of the World War, economic difficulties, and the general
expansion of governmental activities required greatly augmented
governmental revenue, both state and federal. Because of these
latter conditions, the last twenty-five years have seen an un-
paralleled extension of the excise, occupational, and privilege taxes.
These years have likewise seen a complete departure from the long
standing separation in the tax bases of the state and federal gov-
ernments. The latter has been unable, because of the practical
limitations arising from the requirement of apportionment, to ex-
tend its taxing power to reach a broad property tax, but the Six-
teenth Amendment, effective from February 25, 1913, gave it the
power to collect taxes upon incomes, without apportionment among
tie several states, even though such income emanated directly from
property. Temporarily deprived for a few years of the revenue
derivable from an excise tax upon the sale of intoxicating liquors,
it asserted its right to levy excise taxes in innumerable other in-
stances. The states, finding themselves unable to finance their ex-
panding activities through revenue derived from property taxes,
invaded, as it were, the general field of excise taxes, in which, pre-
vious to 1900, they had, almost without exception, confined them-
selves to purely regulatory license taxes.
It is unnecessary to review this recent history of tax develop-
ment. It is only too well known. I likewise conceive that it is not
my function either to praise or criticize this trend of modern taxa-
tion, and I shall confine myself merely to noting some of the ques-
tions and problems that have arisen from this extension of the
scope of excise taxation in its relation to ad valorem taxes. The
first problem - and it is a vital one to the modern practitioner -
is the ever dimming line of demarcation between the legal concept
of a property tax and that of an excise tax. Perhaps the first case
in the history of the United States dealing with this problem was
Hylton v. United States,'3 in which a tax on carriages levied by
13 3 Dall. 171, 1 L. Ed. 556 (U. S. 1796).
7
Dayton: Excise Taxes in Their Relationship to Property Taxes
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1939
EXCISE TAXES - PROPERTY TAXES
Congress in 1794 was held not a direct tax but an excise tax, a hold-
ing vigorously criticized by Madison. Of course, the difficulty in
determining the line of demarcation between property and excise
taxes in the first instance focused chiefly upon the income tax.
Income of an individual is usually derived from many sources. Is
a tax upon that part which originated directly from real estate or
personal property, equivalent to a property tax? The majority
of the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,14
answered in the affirmative. The question is now, of course, an
academic one, so far as the particular tax is concerned, income taxes
being validated eo nomine by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution of the United States and by the amendment ap-
proved in 1932 to the West Virginia Constitution.
The original concept of an excise tax brought it into close rela-
tionship with actual property. It is therefore to be expected that
perhaps the most important group of excise taxes which have
developed during the last thirty years are those having a direct
connection with property. All incidents of ownership and all
activity with respect of property necessarily fall into four great
classifications:
(1) Property, except land and the simplest forms of personal
property, must be given economic usefulness, either by production
if it be a natural resource, by processing or manufacturing, or by
both successively - an economic creation, as it were.
(2) It may be acquired in various ways.
(3) It may be possessed and used by its owner in every lawful
manner.
(4) It may be disposed of either by sale, by gift, by destruction
or consumption, or by testate or intestate transfer at its owner's
death.
It is startling to note that in every classification of these essen-
tial incidents of property ownership, there is to be found a large
number of occupational or privilege taxes.
In case of one of the most fundamental forms of property,
natural resources, such as coal, oil and gas,. in order to acquire
economic usefulness, must be separated from the real estate, and
perhaps the first important phase in West Virginia of the develop-
ment of excise taxation was the period extending over the many
years in which a so-called production tax upon coal, oil and gas
14158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108 (1895).
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was urged and opposed. It is, of course, now embraced in the
Code,"8 and this incident of property activity is taxed. Such a tax
is popularly spoken of as a production tax, and in West Virginia
is imposed upon the business of "producing". Actually it has
many incidents of a property tax. A valuable natural resource
is removed from the land for the purpose of ultimate consumption
and destruction. The depletion of the land and the consequent con-
tinuing diminution of the wealth of the state has been presented as
one of the strong arguments for such tax. In many states similar
taxes are spoken of as "severance taxes", and this phraseology is
not unknown in West Virginia. The tax may be attributed to the
privilege of producing property for economic use, or it may be con-
ceived of as essentially being for the privilege of removing and
destroying suck property itself. The constitutionality of this tax,
including its classification, its exemptions, its possible effect on inter-
state commerce, was upheld in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. HaUl,'6
following Oliver Iron Co. v. Lordy and many other cases of like
holding. Likewise taxes upon articles created by manufacture
have been upheld in numerous cases, and, of course, the various
federal processing taxes come to mind as exemplifying taxes upon
the economic creation of property. In West Virginia there is a
most comprehensive manufacturing and compounding tax em-
braced in the Code.' 8 It is therefore apparent that the initial in-
cident of personal property, the creation of its economic usefulness
through so-called production or manufacture, is fully covered in
recent tax development.
The validity in general of such taxes, as well as of other excise
taxes, cannot be doubted, in view of the position the courts have
taken that a privilege or activity is taxable for the purpose of
raising revenue, even though not of such nature as would make it
subject to the regulatory power of the state. The production or
manufacture of articles of commerce is a fundamental economic
and social necessity. So far from being of a nature requiring regu-
lation, it is to be encouraged. Nevertheless production and manu-
facture do involve activity, and such activity has accordingly been
universally held as the proper subject of occupational tax, in addi-
tion to the ad valorem property tax upon the article itself when pro-
duced or manufactured.
15 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13, § 2(a).
16 102 W. Va. 272, 135 S. E. 582 (1926).
17 262 U. S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929 (1923).
is W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13, § 2 (b).
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Coming to the second incident of property, is its acquisition by
purchase or otherwise a proper subject of excise tax? Perhaps the
most recent important development in excise tax law relates to
taxation upon acquisition of property, and a large number of
states have passed statutes of this character. Such in West Vir-
ginia is the so-called consumers sales tax, now embodied in the
Code.19 The tax is officially and popularly known as a sales tax.
Section 3 of the act imposes the tax upon the privilege of engaging
in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail, and
of dispensing certain selected services. Section 4 provides that the
purc7user shall pay the amount of the tax. Section 11 further pro-
vides, with criminal penalty for infraction, that the seller shall not
absorb any part of the tax. It is obvious therefore that the name
"sales tax" is a misnomer. The seller may not pay the same. He
is the mere collecting agency of the state. The purchaser on ac-
quiring the property may alone pay the tax. For what is he pay-
ing? The answer is obvious - for the privilege of acquiring prop-
erty, and the consumers tax is clearly a tax upon the acquisition
of property. As said by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Kresge Co. v. Bluefeld,'2 involving a municipal con-
sumers sales tax, noted by the court as similar to the state statute,
it is "an exaction from the consumer and not the dealer". In that
decision the court very forcibly distinguishes an excise tax of this
character from a license tax imposed in the exercise of police powers,
and the language of the opinion even disaffirms the element of
privilege as a basis for the tax, saying:
"..... The consumer who pays the tax under consideration will
not thereby derive any privilege he does not already possess.
He has the natural and inherent right to acquire and use the
necessities of life. The validity of a general consumers sales
tax rests upon the obligation of the citizen to support the gov-
ernment and not upon the theory that the right to obtain food,
raiment and shelter, is a taxable privilege.
"It is said that a license charge is a species of excise tax.
This is very true, but it differs from the species of excises
denominated consumers sales tax."2'
Such language is not fully in accord with the underlying theory
of many decisions upholding excise taxes as founded upon a
theoretical privilege, but is in accordance with the universal cur-
19 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 15.
20 117 W. Va. 17, 183 S. E. 601 (1936).
211. at 20.
10
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rent of modern authority that an excise tax need not be predicated
upon an activity subject to the regulatory power of the state.
Certainly Kresge Co. v. Bluefield, as well as the inherent nature of
the tax, make it apparent that the consumers sales tax is not upon
the transfer of title from seller to purchaser, but is an exaction
upon the purchaser, brought about by his receipt or acquisition of
property.
Legacy taxes as distinguished from estate taxes are admittedly
taxes upon the privilege of acquiring property by an heir or legatee.
Other examples could be cited of a tax upon the acquisition of
property as distinguished from a tax paid by the seller for the
privilege of selling property, and it is apparent that the second
incident of property, its acquisition, has been well covered by the
occupational tax.
The third incident of property is its possession and use by the
owner. In this classification there are necessarily two situations
presented - property may be owned without current monetary or
commercial benefit, or it may be of such nature, or may De so used,
that it will yield an income or other benefit to the owner. A sim-
ple example is found in the case of real estate. A man may own
a tract of land which brings him no income whatsoever. He may
own a residence which brings no monetary return, but does bring
a return in the benefit derived from the owner's personal use, or he
may own land, improved or unimproved, which yields an income
in the form of rent, royalty or the like. He may own personal prop-
erty wholly unproductive, or that yielding income, interest or
dividends.
First, let us consider whether or not in the modern develop-
ment of excise tax law the mere ownership of property, without
accompanying current benefit, is subject to tax as distinguished
from the property itself. Until recent years, I believe no one would
have doubted the proposition that the bare ownership of property
involved no privilege of a character taxable otherwise than by' ad
valorem taxation. Any property must have an owner in order'that
it be subject to tax. There can be no tax without a taxpayer.
Clearly the bare ownership of property is covered, and exclusively
covered, by the tax upon the property itself. It is certainly in
the last realm of sophistry to say that if I have a wholly unproduc-
tive piece of land, I must pay a tax upon the land itself because it
exists and I am the owner of it, and must pay a second tax for the
privilege of owning it, or that the privilege of owning unproduc-
11
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tive land or personal property is distinguishable from the owner-
ship itself. Nevertheless, attempts in recent years have been made
to tax the privilege of owning unproductive property. An inter-
esting example, somewhat earlier than most taxes of this character,
is found in the Code of West Virginia, 2 imposing a tax of five per-
cent an acre upon land, productive or unproductive, held in excess
of ten thousand acres by a corporation, the act reciting that the
exaction is "for the privilege of acquiring and holding of land".
By its language and the time of its original adoption, this tax was
undoubtedly considered a pure license tax as distinguished from an
excise tax. Much may be said for the validity of this tax, if it be
treated as a pure license tax. It is levied upon a corporation - an
artificial creature of the state which exercises the privileges of cor-
porate activity by the grace'of the state. However, a similar tax
in Mlississippi applicable to both individuals and firms, was held
unconstitutional in Thompson, Auditor v. Kredltzer,2 hereafter
more fully discussed, as being a discriminatory tax on property,
and not a privilege tax. The constitutionality of this tax has never
been raised in West Virginia so faras I am advised, although the
section is cited, for illustrational purposes, in the concurring opin-
ion of Judge Miller in Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley.2 4
Perhaps the most interesting example of an attempt to tax a
privilege incident to the bare ownership of property is presented
hi the case of Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,2 1
involving a so-called annual license tax imposed by the state of
Kentucky upon each gallon of whiskey either withdrawn from
bond or transferred in bond to a point outside of the state. The
Supreme" Court of the United States characterized such activity
as the mere exercise of that dominion necessarily comprised with-
in the ownership of property, and invalidated the statute as being
a property, and not a privilege, tax. The following significant
language occurs in the opinion of Justice Brandeis, speaking for a
unanimous court:
..... The whole value of the whisky depends upon the owner's
right to get it from the place where the law has compelled
him to put it, and'to tax the right is to tax the value.' To
levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to tax the
property." 2
22 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 12, § 66.
23 112 Miss. 165, 72 So. 891 (1916).
24 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (1910).
25 255 U. S. 288, 41 S. Ct. 272, 65 L. Ed, 638 (1921).
28 Id. at 294.
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In TFhompson, Auditor v. Kreutzer, the supreme court of
Mississippi was considering an acreage tax imposed on firms and
individuals for the so-called privilege of owning land in excess
of one thousand acres, such tax being in addition to the ordinary
ad valorem tax of the state, the constitution of which required
uniformity in property levies. The court invalidated the tax as
being a property tax, using the following significant language
in the opinion:
"Ownership is not a privilege conferred by government,
but is one of the rights which governments were organized
to protect. Discarding, then, the word 'privilege' and substi-
tuting therefor the proper word 'right', the distinction here
sought to be made by the attorney-general is one without a
difference. In a strict legal sense, 'property' (from the Latin
word proprius, meaning belonging to one; one's own) is syn-
onymous with the 'right of ownership' and means one's ex-
clusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a
thing..."
"Property may also be, and in the section of the Constitu-
tion here under consideration is, used to signify 'things. owned'.
In order that a thing may be owned, some one must, of course,
have a right to the ownership thereof. A tax on a thing is a
tax on all its essential attributes; and a tax on an essential
attribute of a thing is a tax on the thing itself."2 7
Other cases might be cited to the* same effect, and probably
today a tax on the naked right of unproductive ownership would-
not be sustained by the courts as based upon a so-called privilege
if super-added to a property tax upon the thing itself. The
validation of such an enactment may be the next step in the
so-called progress of tax law.
When, however, property is held for productive use, the sit-
uation presented is different. Real estate is rented, and royalties
or rentals are received by the owner. Corporate dividends are paid
upon stock or interest paid upon notes. Is the privilege of re-
ceiving such usufruct taxable in addition to -the tax upon the
property itself? Any benefit, either in money, in kind, or other-
wise, derived from property involves the enjoyment of that proper-
ty, as does the use of property by the owner for his own purposes
or convenience. If benefit derived in terms of money from property
be considered a taxable privilege, it would seem necessarily to
follow that the mere use of property or the mere having of it,
27 112 Mois. 165 167, 72 So. 891 (1916).
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providing it brought some convenience or enjoyment to the owner,
0-ould involve a taxable privilege. If I own two houses, occupy
one myself and rent the other, and the receipt of rent be a taxable
privilege, certainly the equivalent personal use and enjoyment
which I derive from the other property would likewise be a taxable
privilege if the legislature so elected. The question, therefore,
reduces itself to the simple statement - does the enjoyment of
property, either through personal use by the owner or through the
receipt of monetary benefits or usufruct in kind, involve a taxable
privilege separate from, and in addition, to, the ad valorem tax upon
the property itself? Until recently I believe the universal answer
would have been in the negative. The value of property ownership,
and its only value, necessarily consists of deriving benefit from it
in the form of personal use, income or future realization, the latter
certainly being a hope or prospect not currently taxable as involv-
ing a present privilege. Ownership of property would be entirely
valueless if it did not carry with it, as an incident, the right to
enjoy that property, and certainly taxation of the thing itself
would logically cover the enjoyment of that thing.
Such, until recent years, has been the undoubted reasoning
underlying the law. In Hylton v. United States, perhaps the most
liberal of the early cases in upholding an excise tax, it was stated
in the opinion by Justice Paterson:
" ... Perhaps, the immediate product of land, in its original
and crude state, ought to be considered as the land itself; it
makes part of it; or else the provision made against taxing
exports would be easily eluded. Land independently of its
produce, is of no value"'8
During the century following the Hylton case this concept
became more and more fixed. Ninety-eight years later it was the
basis of decision in the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tritst
Co., the philosophy of which, as stated in the opinion of Chief
Justice Fuller, was as follows:
". .. A tax upon one's whole income is a tax upon the annual
receipts from his whole property, and as such falls within
the same class as a tax upon that property, and is a direct tax,
in the meaning of the Constitution".29
Departing from this doctrine in its reasoning, but decided
largely upon the particular provision of the Virginia Constitution
28 3 Dall. 171, 177, 1 L. Ed. 556 (U. S: 1796).
29 158 U. S. 601, 625, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108 (1895).
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and statutes is the case of Hunton v. Conmonwealth,30 a case in-
volving inclusion of property-income in a return for net personal
income tax. A different situation is there presented than that
present when an excise is imposed for the specific privilege of collect-
ing or receiving income from property, a typical example of which
is the West Virginia amendment of 1935 to the business-profes-
sion tax, hereafter discussed.
No state has gone farther than West Virginia in affirming,
in non-tax cases, the identity of property and usufruct or income
from that property. The leading case of Paxton v. Benedum-Trees
Oil Co.,3 immediately comes to mind, a case holding that real
estate and its royalties and rents from it were so inseparable that
a grant of the latter was tantamount to a conveyance of the corpus
itself. In this opinion, in quotation from the Supreme Court of
the United States, the following language appears:
" 'A right to land essentially implies a right to the profits
accruing from it, since without the latter, the former can be
of no value. Thus, a devise of the profits of land, or even a
grant of them, will pass a right to the land itself.' (Shep.
Touch. 93 Co. Litt. 4 b.) 'For what,' says Lord Coke, in this
page, 'is the land, but the profits thereof.' "32
The ownership of real estate and the right to receive royalties
therefrom were held inseparable in Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co.
v. Ankrom,33 Ausgrave v. Musgrave,4 and other cases. However,
the question in its tax implications came before the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in Laing v. Fox, State Tax Commis-
sioner,35 involving the statutory provision' 6 imposing a privilege
tax upon every person engaging or continuing within the state in
any business, profession, trade, occupation or calling not included
in the other subdivisions. Involved in that case was income received
by the taxpayer from property, and the third syllabus states that
the section in question was inclusive of taxpayer's receiving income
from loans and investments. In its discussion of this question the
court said:
"We reject the theory of plaintiff that income from loans
and investments is not an income of a 'business, profession,
,o 166 Va. 229, 183 S. E. 873 (1936).
3' 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472 (1917).
32 Id. at 194.
383 W. Va. 81, 97 S. E. 593 (1918).
34 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302 (1920).
3r 115 W. Va. 272, 175 S. E. 354 (1934).
3q W, Va, Acts 1933 c. 33, § 2(i),
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trade, occupation or calling' within the meaning of the statute,
which provides that "business', as used therein, 'shall include
all activities engaged in or caused to be engaged in with the
object of gain or economic benefit either direct or indirect.'
The lending or investing of money requires of one so engaged
active and discriminate judgment".3 7
No issue can be taken with the court that the lending or in.
vesting of money requires active and discriminate judgment, and
upon this reasoning the opinion is based. What, however, is to be
said of the passive receipt of income from property previously
invested perhaps by one other than the taxpayer? Let us say that
an infant of tender years becomes owner of a bond as distributee
or legatee of a decedent. The investment has been made and the
discriminate judgment exercised long prior to the taxable year in
question. The present owner would not be capable of "active and
discriminate judgment", to use the words of the court. The only
value of the bond, in addition to the expected return of the princi-
pal, is the receipt of interest. The bond is properly returned for
taxation and an ad valorem tax paid upon it. During the course
of any particular year the infant, through its guardian, receives
interest, such receipt being entirely passive upon its part, involving
actually no exercise of judgment. Can it be said that the passive
receipt, without any activity of investment or judgment, involves
a taxable privilege separate and apart from ownership of the bond
itself, which is the subject of an ad valorem tax ? The opinion of
the court in the Laing case does not so indicate, but makes it clear
that the basis of a tax is the lending and investing of money re-
quiring of one so engaged active and discriminate judgment.
Following the decision in Laing v. Fox, the business-profes-
sion tax of West Virginia was expanded in 1935,81 specifically
imposing a tax upon every person engaging or continuing in the
"business of collecting" incomes from the use of property in the
form of rentals, royalties, fees, interest or otherwise. This statute
came before the federal courts in litigation which culminated in the
decisions of James v. United Artists Corporation,"9 finally decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the current year.
That case involved a taxpayer engaged in the business of dis-
tributing motion picture films for exhibition and collecting a com-
pensation or so-called rental for the use thereof. There was not
3 115 W. Va. 272, 286, 175 S. E. 354 (1934).
38 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 86, W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13, § 2 (i).
39 305 U. S. 410, 59 S. Ct. 272, 83 L. Ed. 246 (1939).
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involved the question of passive receipt of income, the activities
incident to the business involved being noted in the opinion of the
Court. The question was whether those activities were exercised
within the state of West Virginia, and the decision of the lower
court that the taxpayer was not doing business within the state and
that the attempted tax was an unconstitutional burden on inter-
state commerce was affirmed. The case throws little light on the
problem here presented as to whether or not enjoyment of prop-
erty through passive receipt of income involves a taxable privilege.
The act of 1935 imposes the tax on the business of "collecting in-
comes". The word "collecting" appears to involve an idea of
greater activity than mere passive receipt, but is a matter of
speculation as to what the decision of the court will be if the ques-
tion ever comes squarely before it as to whether or not such passive
receipt of income, unaccompanied by any activity or exercise of
discriminate judgment, involves a taxable privilege distinguished
from the ownership of the property itself. It therefore may be said
with respect to the third classification of attributes of property
that mere ownership, without derivation of income or benefit, does
not involve a taxable privilege. The collecting of income from
property, real or personal, in whatever form, may be subject to a
privilege tax, provided there be accompanying activity in invest-
ment or in the exercise of judgment respecting such investment.
*Whether or not passive receipt of income alone, unaccompanied by
such activity, is subject to a privilege tax is still an open question.
Coming to the fourth incident of property involving the dis-
posal thereof by the owner, such disposal may be in four different
ways: (a) destruction, without any commercial benefit; (b) sale
by the owner during his lifetime, or destruction for a consideration,
which amounts to a sale; (c) gift by the owner during his life-
time; (d) transfer at death either under a will or under intestacy
law. Sales and the privilege of selling property are, of course,
common subjects of excise taxes. Section 2(c) of the West Virginia
business-profession tax and many other examples occur to the mind.
The validity of these taxes is no longer open to doubt. Likewise the
disposal of property by gift is a privilege certainly taxable under
the decision of Bromley v. McCaugn,40 which holds that the mak-
ing of a gift of property is an exercise of only one incident of
ownership and involves the exercise of a taxable privilege dis-
associated from the property itself. Distinguishing between gen-
4o 280 U. S. 124, 50 S. Ct. 46, 74 L. Ed. 226 (1929).
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eral ownership and particular acts of ownership, Justice Stone,
speaking for the majority of the Court, says:
" . .. While taxes levied upon or collected from persons be-
cause of their general ownership of property may be taken to
be direct, .... this Court has consistently held, almost from
the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power
over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need
not be apportioned, and it is enough for present purposes that
this tax is of the latter class ....
"It is a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of
those powers incident to ownership, the power to give the
property owned to another. Under this statute all the other
rights and powers which collectively constitute property or
ownership may be fully enjoyed free of the tax." '42
The learned justice delivering the opinion evidently realized
that if a tax upon one attribute of ownership were permitted, there
might be successive excises upon the various incidents of owner-
ship until their cumulative effect would be to tax the general
privilege of ownership, in addition to the tax on the property it-
self - a forecast which a review of subsequent tax development
clearly shows to have been well founded. He meets the problem by
stating it, and merely declaring that it is not before the Court, in
the following language:
"It is said that, since property is the sum of all the rights
and powers incident to ownership, if an unapportioned tax on
the exercise of any of them is upheld, the distinction between
direct and other classes of taxes may be wiped out, since the
property itself may likewise be taxed by resort to the expe-
dient of levying numerous taxes upon its uses; that one of the
uses of property is to keep it, and that a tax upon the posses-
sion or keeping of property is no different from a tax on the
property itself. Even if we assume that a tax levied upon all
the uses to which property may be put, or upon the exercise
of a single power indispensable to the enjoyment of all others
over it, would be in effect a tax upon property, .... and hence
a direct tax requiring apportionment, that is not the case be-
fore US. " 4 2
However, whatever may be thought as to the soundness of
Bromlej d v. McCaughn in tax philosophy, its effect in upholding a
gift tax as upon the exercise of a privilege and not upon property
may not be doubted.
411 . at 136.
•12 Id. at 137.
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Of course, that disposal or transfer of property most interest-
ing from the viewpoint of the lawyer ensues upon the death of an
owner. Necessarily his ownership ceases and there is an involun-
tary transfer of title either under his will or under the law of
intestate succession. In this field is perhaps the furthest extension
of excise taxes in their relationship to property. With the de-
mands of government, both state and federal, for further sources
of revenue arising after the turn of the century, taxation upon the
passing and receipt of estates was most intriguing to law-makers
and economists. Precedents could be found in Europe. Prior to
the actual enactments of the statutes themselves, much was writ-
ten in support of the philosophy of the succession tax. It was in-
sisted that the right of succession whereby property passed from
a decedent to his heirs or devisees, was not a natural right, not a
right even inherent in the property, but was a benefit in the nature
of a favor conferred by the state, and that usually property de-
volved upon those who had not assisted in accumulating or earning
it. It was argued as being in the nature of a gratuity to them, not
emanating solely from their ancestor, but by reason of the benefi-
cial favor of the state that permitted and safeguarded such devolu-
tion. Such argument, coupled with a feeling that this new form
of taxation would tend to divide great estates and prevent undue
concentration of wealth very early in the modern development of
excise law, led to extensive succession taxes. The result was that
in the realm of succession taxes a more intensive taxation fol-
lowed than in any other branch of excise taxation. Every transfer
of property is composed of two elements, (a) the passage of title
from the transferror, and (b) the receipt of title by the transferee.
In virtually all instances of taxation of transfers, only one element
is taxed. By the West Virginia business-profession tax, in so
far as it relates to the sale of property, the passage of title from
the transferror alone is taxed. The so-called consumers sales ,tax
touches only the acquisition of property by a purchaser. By reason
of provisions as to their respective fields of operation, exemptions
and the like, these two taxes as presently in effect in West Virginia
do not impinge one upon the other to any marked degree. It is
conceivably possible that they might be extended and merged so
that every sale of property would be subject to two kinds of tax-
(1) upon the seller for the privilege of divesting himself of title,
and (2) upon the purchaser for the privilege of receiving the
title. Such a multiplicity of taxation arising from one trans-
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action, placed in the simple framework of a sale of personal prop-
erty probably excites a sense of injustice. If I pay two cents under
the consumers sales tax for the privilege of buying a dollar's worth
of property, it would undoubtedly strike me as unjust if the seller
at the same time paid two cents for the privilege of selling me that
property. However, such multiplicity of excise tax is exactly
what has happened in the realm of succession taxes. In the writ-
ing and public discussion preceding the enactment of these statutes
in America, there was stressed the privilege that a decedent had in
the assurance, as a matter of governmental favor, that his prop-
erty might go to those dearest to him, and there was even greater
emphasis that those who received such property were the bene-
ficiaries ,of governmental grace, in that they became the owner
of that which they had not earned and for which they had paid
no consideration. Accordingly, two definite types of succession
taxes arose: (1) what we usually call an estate tax, measured by
the estate of the decedent as a, whole, predicated upon the trans-
fer of title from a decedent, and (2) the inheritance or legacy
tax based upon the privilege of receipt by the heir or distributee.
In West Virginia, as in many other states, the taxpayer faces both
of these taxes, emanating as they do from the same transfer of prop-
erty. The federal statute imposes a typical estate tax, measured
by the net amount of the estate as a whole, graduated only with
respect of amount and not affected by any status of the ultimate
beneficiary or his relationship to the deceased, except only, of
course, there are the usual charitable and governmental exemp-
tions. The West Virginia inheritance tax, on the other hand, has
always been a legacy or inheritance tax. Payable by the executor
in the first instance, it nevertheless is based solely upon the legacies
received, with rates varying not only with respect to the amount of
the legacy, but according to the relation between the deceased and
the particular recipient. Under the federal law, a net estate of a
million dollars left to one child or ten children, carries the same
tax, whereas under the state law, in the first case there would be
one legacy of a million dollars upon which the tax would be
predicated, and in the second case there would be ten legacies of
one hundred thousand dollars, with correspondingly less tax. The
first federal succession tax since the Civil War was embraced with-
in the act of Congress of June, 1898, usually spoken of as the
Spanish War revenue act, and embraced an imposition upon
legacies and distributive shares of personal property. The con-
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stitutionality of this case came before the Court in Knowlton v.
Moore.4 3 Reviewing early precedents under similar acts in various
states and other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of the United
States pointedly held that succession taxes were not property
taxes, but were upon the transmission or receipt of property, and
were accordingly constitutional, without apportionment under
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Therefore,
citizens of West Virginia, as well as those in many other states,
encounter perhaps the utmost refinement of privilege tax phi-
losophy whereby a tax is paid upon property transferred by reason
of a decedent's losing title through death, and at the same time a
tax by reason of the recipient's gaining title.
The distinction between these two types of succession tax is
clearly stated by the supreme court of West Virginia in the recent
case of Central Trust Co. v. James, in the following language:
"The difference between these taxes, federal and state,
respectively, is clear and emphatic; the one is on the right to
transmit and the other on the right to receive". 44
Difficulties arose in the administration of these two taxes,
particularly turning upon the question as to whether or not an
estate tax was to be deducted in computing the amount of subse-
quent legacies for inheritance tax purposes. It would seem ob-
vious that such tax, being in diminution of the estate as a whole and
a prior charge thereon, must be deducted in computing an inherit-
ance tax, as certainly no legatee could receive a legacy which had not
borne its share of the former tax. Some courts, however, not
recognizing the essential difference between the two taxes, refused
such deduction. A greater number held otherwise and allowed
the deduction, included in which is the supreme court of West Vir-
ginia, speaking in the Central Trust Company case just referred
to.
Not only is a multiplicity of tax attributable to one transfer of
property by reason of the two types of succession taxes, with an
undoubted right in both the state and Federal Government to im-
pose both, but it has recently been pronounced that a right may
adhere in more than one state to impose inheritance taxes upon the
transfer of the same intangible property. I refer to the case of
Curry v. McCanless," decided by the Supreme Court of the United
43 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969 (1900).
44199 S. E. 881 (W. Va. 1938).
45 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1939).
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States on May 29, 1939. There, a decedent, resident of Tennessee,
by a trust instrument transferred certain stocks and bonds to a
trust company doing business in Alabama, reserving to herself
the power to remove the trustee, direct the sale and investment of
the trust property, and dispose of the trust estate in her will. Mr.
Justice Stone, speaking for four of the justices, in addition to him-
self, expounded the philosophy that intangibles are rights, not re-
lated to physical things but involving relationship between per-
sons, natural and corporate, which the law recognizes and which
can only be made effective through the control over, and protection
afforded to, those persons whose relationships furnish the origin of
such rights. Apparently no distinction was in the mind of the
learned Justice as between bonds and corporate stock, both of
which were subject to the trust. A bond involves, of course, a per-
sonal obligation undertaken by the debtor, although it is almost
universally also secured by a lien upon particular property. Cor-
porate stock, on the other hand, by numerous decisions has been
defined as representative of an undivided interest in the property
of the corporation remaining after the payment of its debts.
Justice Stone reasons, in effect, that a taxpayer whose intangible
property has a situs in a state other than that of his residence, in-
vokes, as it were, the laws of both states, and that his ownership is
within the jurisdiction of both. He goes to the extent of stating
that the taxation of a corporation by a state wherein it does busi-
ness, measured by the value of all of its intangibles used in its
business there, does not preclude the state of incorporation from
imposing a tax measured by all of its intangibles. As to this point
he speaks only for four justices, including himself, Justice Reed
reserving his conclusion upon this point. Virtually all of the rea-
sohing of the decision is appropriate to property taxation. In the
course of the opinion the writer in fact calls attention to the con-
stitutional power of a trustee's domicile to subject the trust estate
to property taxation, and concludes that since in the instant case
Alabama could lawfully tax the property in the trustee's hands,
there was no ground for saying that it could not tax the transfer
of it, or an interest in it, upon the death of the beneficial owner.
Of course, the majority opinion in this case recognizes that the tax
there imposed was upon a transfer at death, and not actually in
rem upon the property itself, but it virtually assumes that the same
jurisdictional rules apply to transfer taxes that apply to property
taxes. Perhaps Curry v. McCanless goes further than any other
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decided case which the writer has been able to find in its disregard
of the essential difference between an excise tax imposed upon trans-
fer of property at death, and a property tax. It is certainly con-
fusing, if not disturbing, to the mind of the tax practitioner, and
many questions arise. What, for example, would be the effect if
the laws of the two states in question as to the devolution of per-
sonal property were different? This question evidently occurred
to Justice Stone, but he contents himself with saying that there is no
conflict between the laws of the two states particularly involved.
Such, of course, is fortuitous circumstance, and if the case con-
tinue as a precedent, what answer will be given where there is a
difference in the succession laws of two states? Suppose - and the
situation must often occur - that in one state a surviving spouse
receives, under the intestacy law, all personal property to the ex-
clusion of children, whereas in the second state there is a division
between them. The property at death must be transferred to some-
one. Let us assume that the law of the first state governed, and the
surviving spouse received the entire distribution of the personal
estate. Under the Curry case the second state, taxing because of
the locus of the property prior to death, would be taxing theoretical
transfers to the children who never actually received anything.
Each state would be taxing transfers of the same property on ac-
count of the same death that were utterly inconsistent one with the
other. Furthermore, if any state may impose a succession tax upon
the ground that during lifetime the owner of the property in ques-
tion had invoked its law to preserve and enforce his rights of own-
ership, most complicated situations would arise and taxes be multi-
plied indefinitely. Assume a decedent, a resident of West Vir-
ginia, had owned a note which he had deposited with an agent or
trustee in Pennsylvania, secured by a mortgage upon real estate
in Kentucky, executed by a debtor living in Maryland. At the
time of his death he was foreclosing the mortgage in Kentucky
and suing the debtor personally in Maryland, thereby invoking the
laws of the two states, while, so* long as the note physically remained
in Pennsylvania, the laws of that state were certainly invoked for
its protection. Could these three states, as well as the state of
domicile, four in all, each impose a succession tax merely because the
laws of all of them were being invoked for the protection of owner-
ship during the life of decedent? Their laws of succession might
be wholly different. Could there be a valid concept of taxable trans-
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fer at death of the same property in all four states, with different
recipients in the different jurisdictions ?
Many other questions arise under the Curry case. Whatever
may be thought of its reasoning, and however acute are the prob-
lems that can arise under it, it is nevertheless a landmark in the
development of excise tax law. In addition to duplication of taxa-
tion with respect of the same transfer, springing from the two
types of succession taxes, and in addition to the concurrent rights
to tax in the state and federal governments, it permits a multi-
plicity of taxation among different states. It might very well hap-
pen, in the case of a large estate, that the aggregate taxes upon the
various theoretical transfers of an item of intangible personal
property would exceed the total value of the property itself.
In conclusion, I wish again to revert to Bromley v. McCaughm,
decided almost exactly ten years ago, a case sustaining, as has been
seen, the validity of the federal gift tax, chiefly on the ground that
it was a privilege tax upon only one incident of property owner-
ship, Justice Stone stating that under that statute other rights of
ownership might be enjoyed free of the tax. In the opinion the
learned justice indicates that a tax levied upon all uses to which
property might be put, might, in effect, be a property tax, but
avoids answering the question implied in such a situation by the
mere statement that such a case was not before him. The situation,
if not in the exact detail indicated, has actually developed in sub-
stance during the last ten years, when the cumulative effect of the
various excise taxes in relation to property is considered. The
result is startling. While these excise taxes do not reach the use of
all property in all particulars, and have various exemptions, the fact
remains that, in all of the four great divisions of an owner's rela-
tionship to his property, there are extensive excise taxes imposing
upon him exactions for the privilege of using, enjoying, or dis-
posing of that which he owns, all in addition to the ad valorem taxes
upon the thing itself. With respect to the manufacture or the pro-
duction of property, we have various sales taxes, manufacturing
taxes and processing taxes. Upon acquisition of property in West
Virginia, and in many other states, there is the so-called consumers
sales tax, and within this realm is operative one of the two great
types of succession taxes - the tax on the receipt of an inheritance
or a legacy. Property having been acquired, excise taxes upon its
enjoyment have been levied, and it is established that if the receipt
of income be accompanied by any activity or discriminate judg-
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ment, there is involved a taxable privilege wholly disassociated from
the tax on the property itself. It is possible that the mere passive
receipt, unaccompanied by any activity or exercise of judgment,
may also be held a taxable privilege. Upon the fourth attribute
of property, its disposal, we have sales taxes, stamp taxes, and, for
the privilege of disposal by gift, there is, of course, the gift tax.
Upon transfer at death there is both an estate tax upon the passing
of title from the decedent, and an inheritance or legacy tax upon
the receipt of the property by the legatee or distributee, and there
may be multiplicity of state taxation as to the latter.
The foregoing summary, of course, involves, indiscriminately,
taxes laid by the federal and state governments. In some cases there
is duplication, in others there is not, but in virtually all instances
there is the power to levy the particular type of tax, in each sov-
ereign. There are, of course, some species of property, the enjoy-
ment of which has not yet been taxed, and there are various ex-
emptions, but the power to extend excise taxes is ever present, and
during the last ten years there has been a tremendous tax expan-
sion which may well continue.
I wish carefully to avoid overstatement, but I believe it is
time that an owner of property, in addition to the ad valorem tax
upon the property itself, may be, and in many instances is, subject
to a privilege tax upon every one of the four great incidents of
ownership of property, and that the only so-called privileges that
such owner may exercise with freedom from excise is the naked
ownership of property, without any beneficial use, income or activ-
ity with respect of it, and the right to dispose of property through
final consumption or destruction, without financial benefit or con-
sideration. To have property without income or productive use,
and to destroy property without financial benefit or consideration,
are the only two attributes of ownership, dry and profitless as they
are, that an owner may have without present danger of a privilege
tax in West Virginia. In some states even the bare privilege of
bringing, and using, property into the jurisdiction- is made the
subject of an excise tax, supplementary to the so-called consumers
sales tax. Such legislation was introduced in the last session of the
West Virginia Legislature, but did not pass.
Nothing is farther from my intention than to indicate dissent
from the philosophy of the excise tax, or to criticize any particular
tax that has been here discussed. Such is not my function nor my
desire. Virtually all tax practitioners, as well as economists, recog-
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nize that both property and the activities of individuals, being the
foundation of all economic and social relationships, are, in proper
cases and, above all, to a reasonable degree, each a legitimate basis
for taxation. While a particular excise tax in its relation to prop-
erty, may be sound and subject to no criticism, the temptation in
the minds of the legislators (a temptation to which we may per-
haps say Justice Stone yielded in Bromley v. Mcaaughn) is to con-
sider that particular tax in its single relationship to property taxes.
It is when the cumulative effect of all excise or privilege taxes are
considered that we turn to the underlying thought of Justice
Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Federal Intermediate Credit
Bank v. Mitchell," that most of the distinctions of the law are dis-
tinetions of degree. When it is considered that, in addition to
taxes upon property itself, privilege taxation has expanded to such
a degree that every profitable incident or use to which property may
be put may be taxed, and in many instances is so taxed, all in addi-
tion to ad valorem taxes, a situation is presented which must make
us all pause and consider.
40 277 U. S. 213, 48 S. Ct. 449, 72 L. Ed. 854 (1928).
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